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1. INTRODUCTION
Our goal is to explain the basic properties of Russia’s economy, especially
wide-spread usage of money substitutes and price distortions, as resulting
from the structure inherited from the Soviet Union and the government
policies. It is also necessary to examine the mechanism of the transfer of
value from more productive agents to less productive ones.
Starting with Karpov’s report (1997) (see Kuznetz (1998)) and papers
of Gaddy and Ickes (1998), it has become a widely spread perception of
the Russian economy as the virtual economy with a number of special
features different both from a market economy and a command economy
(see Guriev and Pospelov (1998), Ericson (1998), Gaddy and Ickes (1999),
Guriev and Ickes (1999), Ericson and Ickes (1999, 2000), Marin (2000),
Guriev and Kvassov (2000), Guriev and Makarov (2000) and the bibliog-
raphy there). Certainly, any transition economy differs from the above
types of economies, but a word “transition” presupposes a passing stage
of a transformation from a command economy into a normal market one
whereas the Russian Economy enjoys several stable abnormal properties,
which do not exhibit a tendency to fade out. This means that the Rus-
sian Economy may be in a new steady state, which rises the necessity of
constructing appropriate macroeconomic models.
One of the key features of the Russian Economy is the wide-spread use
of barter and money substitutes (see e.g. empirical studies Aukutsio-
nek (1994, 1998), Commander and Mumssen (1998), Dolgopiatova (1998),
Guriev and Ickes (1999)), which is much more prominent than in other
Transition Economies (Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (1999)). At the same
time, after August 1998 crisis, the volume of money substitutes in circu-
lation decreased significantly, though no serious restructuring had taken
place. To understand properly the nature of the problem, it is necessary
to realize which exogenous factors lead to the endogenous appearance of
money substitutes, and how the economy reacts to various subsidy policies.
Models which explain the endogenous appearance of money substitutes
are necessary because they highlight the main structural problems, which
lead to the reappearance of money substitutes (by the way, we know of
a network of interconnected firms in Rostov region, which did not use
money substitutes till August 2000 but started to use them since then;
they use vekselya when it comes to settle mutual arrears in the beginning
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of each quarter). In particular, any model that has no role for endogenous
use of means of exchange will give unduly importance to purely monetary
policy mechanisms. The main message of our model is that the Russian
economic system will produce sufficient amount of endogenous liquidity at
any circumstances, and that it can be in two steady states, with essentially
different volumes of notes in circulation but approximately the same price
systems.
Besides, if one is to analyze possible future states of the economy after this
or that sort of restructuring, one must model the endogenous dynamics
of prices, which crucially depends on the properties of various means of
exchange circulating in the economy. The important consequence of the
peculiar structure of Russian economy is the transfer of value from the
productive enterprizes to unproductive ones.
According to the contemporary Monetary Theory it does not suffice just
to state the existence of money and money substitutes and list the em-
pirical facts about their use. Also, without the modeling of properties of
monies as arising endogenously, it is impossible to access future prices. Un-
fortunately, this very important fact is overlooked, when investors access
Russian firms or investment projects: if one seriously believes in changes
in the future, then one has to acknowledge the fact that the net present
value of an investment project calculated under assumption of the rela-
tive stability of the existing price system is bound to drastically depart
from the reality1. In addition, the whole price system of the economy will
change should the subsidy system change.
As far as the study of Russia’s economy concerned, our model is the first
macro-model based on the principles of the modern Monetary Theory,
which studies the interactions among the main actors of the economy. At
the same time, we obtain new results for Monetary Theory per se.
The endogenous appearance of money substitutes in an economy is an
old issue in Monetary Economics; we are interested in money and money
substitutes as media of exchange. Walrasian equilibrium models implicitly
assume an auctioneer, who observing the goods suggested for trade chooses
market clearing prices. Hence, Walrasian equilibrium (WE) models have
no role for a valued fiat medium of exchange, and since they always as-
sume complete markets, all assets can be traded at given prices in any
circumstances. Therefore, all monetary theories have to depart from WE.
1 In the situation, when the government controls most of the economy, changes
can take place at any moment: suppose, that the government decides that not
only UES, but Gazprom as well should stop to accept and issue vekselya
1. INTRODUCTION 7
However, some monetary models (like money-in-the-utility/production-
function, or transaction costs models) depart only from Walrasian physical
environment (agents, preferences, resources, technology, information struc-
ture), while others (like trading-post models or cash-in-advance models)
depart from the equilibrium concept (rules governing interactions among
agents). Finally, there is a class of models which depart both from physical
environment and equilibrium concepts of WE. One fraction of this class
consists of models with an absence of double coincidence of wants.
Monetary theories should not contain money as a primitive — this is
Wallace’s dictum for Monetary Theory. Models which assume real bal-
ances being arguments of utility or production functions or impose cash-
in-advance constraints do not satisfy this dictum. The main reason is that
they do not permit the assets’ role in exchange to be endogenous. This
role is given to the assets in a model with no double coincidence of wants.
Absence-of-double-coincidence notion goes naturally with pairwise meet-
ings of agents, therefore one theory which satisfies the dictum is a random
matching model. Random meetings imply that agents cannot choose whom
to meet with, therefore they have to search. Monetary search models show
how fiat currency can be valued, how endogenous commodity money can
arise; they can also discuss international monetary issues and address a
variety of other questions in monetary economics.
Random matching monetary models with indivisible goods and money
study exchange processes where, once agents meet, they exchange and
part company. However, this framework is not interesting enough because
prices are given exogenously. One of the ways to generalize these models
is to make goods divisible, then the rate at which agents exchange can
be determined by bilateral bargaining. A strategic bargaining model is
due to Rubinstein and Wolinsky. This is an essentially dynamic model,
however it is possible to show that the equilibrium outcome of the strategic
bargaining game can be approximated by the generalized Nash bargaining
solution which is inherently static, and therefore tractable.
One of the important questions addressed by monetary economics is
whether the private sector should be allowed to create money. One con-
cern, which holds for any economy, is what mechanisms could prevent a
private monetary system from printing too much money. Monetary mod-
els which use random matching to represent a trading process, were intro-
duced in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989; 1991; 1993); for subsequent develop-
ments, see Trejos and Wright (1995), Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1995),
Shi (1997), Wallace (1997) and reviewWallace (1998). Models of this type
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decentralize the trading frictions, abandon the Walrasian fiction and nat-
urally generate transaction demand for money. There are several search-
theoretic models incorporating inside money . The word money indicates
the object which is used as a tangible medium of exchange among the
agents who recognize it as an asset, and the label inside shows that this
object is supplied by the private sector. In Cavalcanti et al. (1999), Cav-
alcanti and Wallace (1999 a, 1999 b), and Williamson (1999) inside money
is given a role both as credit and as a tangible medium of exchange. In
Cavalcanti et al. (1999), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999 a, 1999 b), it is as-
sumed that a fraction of the population — a banking sector — has access
to a private note-issuing technology, while the rest of the economy —
a non-banking sector — uses inside money as a medium of exchange.
In Williamson (1999), a model with claims on banks as private money
is explored. Agents can choose between investing into low or high-return
projects, so there may exist welfare dominated equilibria where banks hold
low-return assets. There is also a paper Burdett et al. (2001), which intro-
duces endogenous money as a commodity that can be either consumed or
stored and used as a medium of exchange. In this model, there is no role
for credit because the trade, if it takes place, is always quid pro quo.
While the endogenous (commodity) money does not require any kind of
pre commitment, since the exchange, if it takes place, is always quid pro
quo; models with inside money need incentives of the agents to be taken
into consideration. Though, originally, credit was completely ruled out of
the random matching framework, it is possible to introduce some form of
credit into monetary models by assuming that either people can commit to
future actions, or (complete or partial) public information about trading
histories is available, or both. The first paper to put partial public knowl-
edge into the random matching setting, was the one of Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1998). In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999) and Cavalcanti,
Erosa and Temzelides (1998), it is assumed that a fraction of population —
a banking sector — has access to a private note-issuing technology, while
the rest of the economy — a non-banking sector — uses inside money
as a medium of exchange. There is a record keeping technology (clearing
house) in the first sector and privacy-of-trading histories in the second sec-
tor. There is also a note redemption technology inside the banking sector
which allows to discipline the amount of notes issued by the banking sector.
Williamson (1999) explores a model with claims on banks as private money.
Agents can choose between investing into low or high-return projects, so
there may exist welfare dominated equilibria where banks hold low-return
assets. Also it is shown that in case of private information, private money
may be subject to lemons problems.
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In addition to the media of exchange produced in the private sector, all
the above models with inside and endogenous money incorporate the ex-
ogenous provision by a public sector of fiat currency usually referred to
as outside or exogenous money. In Burdett et al. (2001), Cavalcanti and
Wallace (1999 a, 1999 b), it is shown that an equilibrium can be achieved
in an economy with only endogenous or inside money (respectively) in
circulation. The former paper also shows that if the supply of exogenous
money is sufficiently small, both types of money may coexist. Cavalcanti
and Wallace (1999 a, 1999 b) consider implementable allocations that arise
with inside and outside money separately; they do not examine coexis-
tence of both kinds of money. In Cavalcanti et al. (1999), coexistence of
private and government money is studied only for the case of a discount
factor close to one, but no analytical results for endogenous variables are
obtained.
In order to explain the endogenous appearance and circulation of money
substitutes in the economy, we take the monetary search approach. Agents
are placed in a standard environment (see Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)),
in which different people have different preferences over a large number
of differentiated goods. Our model combines more essential features than
models in op.cit. The closest to our paper are papers Cavalcanti and
Wallace (1998, 1999), Burdett et al (1998) and Cavalcanti et al (1998).
Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998, 1999) consider implementable allocations
which arise with inside and outside money separately, they do not examine
coexistence of both kinds of monies. Burdett et al (1998) consider only
commodity money as inside money, so they do not have to take into account
incentive compatibility constraints etc, since the trade if it takes place is
always quid pro quo. In Cavalcanti et al (1998), there is a finite number
of consumption goods and individuals. Agents of type i can consume
good i and produce good i+ 1. A banking sector is a real banking sector
with clearing house, reserve keeping and possibility of being dissoluted
if notes redeemed exceeds reserve balance. Coexistence of private and
government money is studied only for the case of discount factor close
to 1, but neither analytical results for endogenous variables are obtained
nor the case of agents of different levels of ineffectiveness is studied (the
last remark concerns other papers as well). Notice that all the models
above describe the reality much simpler than Russia’s economy, and cannot
be directly applied to the study of the latter. Even the simpler two-
sector model, which we constructed two years ago S. I. Boyarchenko, and
S. Z. Levendorskiˇi (2000, 2001), lead to results which were new for the
search-theoretical approach (for the detailed discussion, see op.cit.) We
modeled the virtual economy as consisting of two sectors
• a sector of more productive new or restructured and privatized firms
acting as individually optimizing, or private, agents, and
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• a sector of old, mainly non-restructured and less productive firms, which
can collude and agree on the rules for issuing and redemption of notes.
Thus, the sector of old enterprizes acts as a unique omnipresent agent.
This agent redeems the notes it issues always because this is the optimiz-
ing behavior. Since the agent is omnipresent and does not defect on its
obligations, it is optimal to accept its notes by everybody on conditions
this agent imposes (the optimality is proved and not postulated).2
A note may circulate among productive agents; eventually, it is redeemed
by an agent from the note-issuing sector. Since less productive agents
collude, they agree on conditions for note-issuing and redemption as well
as on the amount they produce in a round of trade for each other. These
conditions and amount are chosen to maximize the welfare of colluding
agents, given the optimizing behavior of private agents. The acceptance of
a medium of exchange is decided optimally by each agent of the productive
and non-productive sectors, in each trade, and the interaction of all these
optimizing actions results in endogenously determined trading strategies,
prices, the amount of notes in circulation and the distribution of money
between private and colluding agents.3
We assume that agents are heterogeneous both in consumption and pro-
duction, and we specify their preferences and production opportunities so
that in no meeting, there is a double coincidence of wants. This naturally
generates the demand for media of exchange.4 In the previous model, we
captured several interesting features of the virtual economy but the model
was not quite appropriate for modeling an incentive to restructure because
among the colluding agents, it did not distinguish between unproductive
enterprizes and the value-adding firms in the energy sector.
In the real counterpart of our model economy, notes of such large firms
as Gazprom and UES are accepted because these firms are large and om-
nipresent, and notes of smaller firms can circulate due to the existence of
2 As Gaddy and Ickes (1998 a) point out, these notes (IOU’s) typically circu-
late among chains of enterprizes short of cash and are eventually redeemed for
gas, electricity etc. by some of them. The use of money substitutes is also
facilitated by wide-spread stable business networks and relations, which help
to organize barter (Here the word “barter” is used in the Russian sense: non-
monetary transaction) chains that can use IOU’s of smaller agents. For empirical
study of transactions conducted using non-monetary methods and instruments,
see Guriev and Ickes (1999), Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (1999), Guriev and
Kvassov (2000), Guriev and Makarov (2000) and the bibliography there.
3 In each steady state, the strategies, prices etc. are uniquely determined
4 The last conclusion remains valid in the more general variant of the model,
where the double coincidence of wants is possible but not in any pair-wise meet-
ing, and hence there is the genuine barter
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well-established connections and barter chains, which play the role of the
clearing house in search-theoretical models with the banking sector. The
redemption of IOU’s for goods is wide-spread in the Russian Economy,
as was mentioned above. So far, our assumptions agree with the real-
ity, except for the fact that the real old sector consists of two parts with
essentially different production properties — a value adding energy part
(Gazprom, UES and Oil companies; we include MPS as well but keep the
name energy sector for simplicity), and low/negative value adding (loss
making) old manufacturing part. Also, there was no government in our
model, with either endogenous or exogenous behavior.
It is an environment with more sectors and the explicit role for the gov-
ernment, which we model and study now. We consider an economy with
three sectors:
• a sector of new or restructured enterprizes, which act as private agents;
• a value adding energy sector (a single actor), which issue notes (money
substitutes);
• a sector of old (mainly loss-making5) non-restructured enterprizes con-
nected by informal networks; the latter allow the sector to choose the
socially optimal level of production in trades inside the sector.
Thus, private agents are the same in our previous and current models,
but colluding agents in the former represented the union of the second and
third sector of the latter. The notes of the energy sector are universally ac-
ceptable as a result of optimizing behavior of all the agents of the economy
(see the discussion about the two-sector model above). Private agents have
no means to collude, so if such an agent issues a note, no other agent of
this type is under an obligation to redeem the note. Hence each such note
will be redeemed with zero probability, and in no symmetric equilibrium
is it optimal for anyone to accept a note issued by a private agent. Thus
we may assume that notes of private agents do not circulate at all. The
energy sector designs note-issuing rules and amount of good produced in
single-coincidence meetings with other agents so as to maximize the wel-
fare of the sector. We assume that even though agents of the unproductive
sector are connected by informal networks and have means to collude, they
do not reveal their trading histories to the outsiders. Therefore, colluding
agents are too unreliable for the outsiders so that the notes issued by such
5 at the equilibrium prices in the sector of private agents and in trades between
the energy sector and the private agents
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agents are not accepted by agents of the other sectors. The agents in the
productive sector are outsiders for the informal networks, and hence can-
not rely on a note being redeemed. Members of a network do not defect on
mutual obligations due to an additional shadow income which they obtain
as members; our model does not model this fine structure of the economy.6
We take this feature as given. We also postulate, that the energy sector
does not accept the media of exchange except for the official money and
notes it issues, in order not to suffer the verification cost. Among its choice
variables, there is the supply of notes, and hence it can increase the supply
if it is necessary.
Inside the unproductive sector, the wide-spread of informal networks re-
sults in the production-exchange policy equivalent to the policy of a central
planner of the sector. Means of exchange inside the sector can be different
such as notes issued by colluding agents and goods.7 It should be noted,
however, that from the point of view of monetary theory, the goods which
are acquired not for the consumption but for the future exchange must be
regarded not as barter goods but as a medium of exchange, called endoge-
nous money. Only goods exchanged for consumption should be regarded
as genuine barter. It is well documented that in Russia, most of the goods
acquired by “barter” serve as media of exchange. This allows us to sim-
plify the problem by eliminating barter: even if we introduce the genuine
barter in our model (which is possible), it will lead to complication of the
formulas but not to significant changes in our conclusions.
To sum up: we model the situation, where many essential patterns of
the behavior of the large part of the economy are given exogenously, and
6 Here is an example. The second author monitors (to rather limited extent)
a network in Rostov region. The main part of the activity yields no profit but
there is just a couple of inputs, which are acquired cheaply, either because they
are obtained from the government sources at an unrealistically low price, or
imported, also at an artificially low price. In effect, the whole activity of the
network is needed to simply distribute the initial external source of value, and
the defection is clearly non-optimizing: one simply loses the stream of profit,
and the only thing one is really capable of, is to participate in the process
of the distribution. The network reproduces the pattern of behavior typical
for the whole Soviet economy, when essentially the main activity was a “fair”
redistribution of the initial source of income.
7 In the aforementioned network, the pattern of exchange changed rather
abruptly several times; at some moment, a bank, which provided trade credit
for free appeared, then notes issued by the agents of the network reappeared;
when I asked why, the answer was (literally): “Somebody decided”. Clearly,
there is really something or someone like a central planner, and the study of the
type and volume of the media of exchange in circulation inside the network is
senseless unless you have an access to the private information about the network.
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where there are large monopolies, everybody has to trade with. The sector
of large monopolies acts as a single actor (subject to constraints imposed
by the government), and only the behavior of productive agents is the
standard optimizing behavior of agents in monetary search models. The
sizes of the sectors, the money supply, utility functions and production
costs of agents are given exogenously. behavior described above. Trading
strategies8 prices, the amount of notes in circulation and the distribution
of the money between sectors are found in an equilibrium as the result of
optimizing behavior of private agents and the energy sector.
We assume that the energy sector has to please the government in order
that an export constraint imposed by the government does not get worse.
As a result, it has to provide the unproductive sector with an amount of
energy sufficient for a production level required by the government. On
the other hand, the current policy of non-acceptance of notes by UES,
clearly being non-optimal from the point of view of an optimizing agent,
is the result of the political will, not the result of the optimizing behavior
given the structure of the economy. Hence, we model this exogenously
given feature by introducing the lower bound on the volume of trades
of the energy sector made with the money only. We also assume that the
government imposes the price ceiling on the money prices of the energy sold
to unproductive agents9. We assume that in trades inside the productive
sector and between productive and unproductive agents, buyers extract all
the surplus.
The prices in trades with the energy sector are determined by the latter
sector in order to maximize the welfare of the sector, except for the price
for the energy sold to unproductive agents in monetary form. The partial
equilibrium model of similar price-discriminating behavior was constructed
by Ericson and Ickes (1999).
Since the real unproductive sector is incapable to pay the necessary amount
of the money as the winter crisis of non-payments and black-outs clearly
demonstrated, we introduce the direct transfer of money into this sector
from the government-controlled part of the energy sector. Formally, the
model allows for the zero volume of the direct subsidies but the analysis
of the model shows that a steady state is impossible without this transfer.
8 E.g. for a private agent, the acceptance/non-acceptance of a note and prices
she agrees to trade at in each type of meeting
9 In order to save them; nevertheless, they remain insolvent without the direct
subsidies — both in the reality and as a conclusion (not assumption!) of our
model, as we will see later
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Since Russia’s economy and government policies are so peculiar10, we are
forced to introduce many exogenous features of the economy, which in-
evitably differ from standard assumptions of search-theoretical models.
The additional exogenous distortions lead to very rich and interesting en-
dogenous pattern of exchange. Hence, the study of the model requires
additional efforts and leads to new results for the search-theoretical ap-
proach to Monetary Economics.
We study the dependence of the volume of notes in circulation on the sizes
of the note-issuing part of the energy sector and the one which uses only
money, and on the money supply, and show that the sharp decline in the
use of notes can be naturally explained as the result of the increase of the
money supply due to the 4-fold increase of the rouble equivalent of USD
in circulation or/and the new policy of UES, both factors working in the
same direction.
Our model shows that generically, the economy may be in either of two
steady states with approximately the same price systems but with different
volumes of notes in circulation, and hence, August 1998 crisis might have
lead to the change of the steady state, the new one having less volume.
We conjecture that should the productive economic activity be suppressed
due to some adverse external shock, the volume of money substitutes in
circulation may sharply increase.
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION
2.1. Preferences and production
Consider an economy, which consists of three sectors:
• G, the energy sector, viewed as a single actor;
• O, the sector of old low productivity firms;
10 However, there is a rationale behind this behavior of the government. We
believe that the most important reason behind the support of the unproduc-
tive sector is to preserve social stability. On the other hand, since there are
instances of how the use of non-monetary means to pay taxes distorts public
policy priorities (for example, the construction of Chelyabinsk subway system,
as documented by Gaddy and Ickes (1998)), the government should have incen-
tives to introduce restructuring into the old sector. Also it is clear that imposing
a cash constraint, the government pursues its goals of tax collection and budget
management. Modeling the incentives of the government in a macro model of
the Russian economy would be an interesting and challenging issue. We leave it
for future projects.
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• E, the sector of high productivity firms.
The last two sectors have a continuum of agents. The total size of the pop-
ulation of the union of O- and E-sectors is normalized to unity, the propor-
tions being pO and pE . The specification of consumption and production
of private agents and non-productive agents is standard for the search-
theoretical models, and the detailed description is as follows. Agents pro-
duce and consume non-storable goods (or services) at discrete points in
continuous time. Agents and goods are indexed by points on a circle of
circumference two. The agents have idiosyncratic tastes for goods in the
sense that at any time, an agent indexed by point i has a demand for a
particular variety of goods which lies within the distance x ∈ (0, 1/2) from
point i.11 Thus we incorporate both heterogeneous consumers and differ-
entiated goods into the economy. When an agent consumes an amount q
of a demanded good, she enjoys utility u(q)12. We assume that u satisfies
standard properties:
u is increasing and concave, (1)
and
u(0) < 0, and u′(q)→ 0 as q → +∞. (2)
Agent i derives no utility from any amount of good lying distance z > x
from i. Thus x characterizes the rate of specialization in consumption.
The consumption technology of agents requires the energy. An attempt to
introduce the energy as the second argument of the utility function leads
to an absolutely intractable model. Instead, we introduce the technology
constraint: a ratio of the average amount of energy consumed by an agent
per unit of time to the average amount of other goods consumed per unit
of time;13 we denote the inverse to this ratio by κ in the model.
Each agent i can instantaneously produce good j at a fixed distance z,
2x < z < 1, clockwise from i. Due to these properties of preferences and
the production technology, agents never produce for themselves. They
must trade in the exchange sector in order to consume. Agents of E-sector
meet each other and agents of O-sector at random. Their trading partners
arrive according to a Poisson process with the constant arrival rate α. It
11By a distance we mean the shortest arc between i and a given good.
12Lest the model becomes intractable, we assume that the utility derived by an
agent from consumption of an amount q of any good within the distance x is
independent of a good; we are indebted to Ken Burdett for this idea.
13We assume that each agent of E- and O-sectors is a part of a firm, which
comprises many agents (the number of firms being large as well), so that it
makes sense to speak about the average rate of consumption of this or that good
by an agent.
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is clear that the specification of preferences and production opportunities
rules out a double coincidence of wants. Thus there can be no direct barter,
and the probability of a single coincidence of wants is x.
The size of G-sector is indirectly characterized by αxQ, the volume of
energy it can produce per unit of time for sales inside the economy. The
utility of consumption of G-sector is assumed to be linear:
U(q) = a+ bq, (3)
the motivation being as follows. The main part of the revenue for G-sector
comes from the part of its output, which it sells outside the economy (i.e.,
abroad) since the agents of the economy cannot pay at higher world prices.
This means that the additional “internal revenue” is a small addition to the
fixed (from the point of view of this model) flow of “foreign revenue” R, and
therefore, the contribution of the internal revenue into the utility can be
calculated from the linear approximation of the utility function around R
(hence, in (3), a = U˜(R), where U˜ is “the genuine utility function”).
G-sector and agents of E-sector suffer a unit marginal cost of production,
and less productive agents of O-sector suffer marginal cost k > 1. All
agents discount future at the rate r > 0.
2.2. Means of exchange and trades
There is the exogenous money supply M ∈ (0, 1). Agents may issue
promissory notes (IOU’s) but only those of G-sector (we call them sim-
ply notes) may circulate and be accepted by everybody; IOU’s of O-sector
may circulate only inside O-sector (the motivation was given above). Since
the informal network in O-sector effectively acts as the central planner,
O-notes are used as a simple accounting tool inside O-sector.
Both money and notes are indivisible and perfectly storable, and an agent
of O-sector and E-sector can carry either 1 unit of money or note or none of
those. This assumption significantly simplifies our model, and still allows
us to endogenize prices as reciprocals to quantities of goods produced for
a unit of money or a note. Each agent from a non-energy sector can be in
one of three states: a buyer carrying a note, a buyer with a unit of money,
or a seller. We denote by V jn , V
j
m, V
j
s , j ∈ {E,O}, the value functions of
the agent in these states.
Agents of E-sector meet with each other or with agents of O-sector pair-
wise and at random, and in each meeting decide whether to trade, and
how much to produce for a note or a unit of money. When two agents
meet they cannot trade unless one agent is a seller and the other is either
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a buyer with a mean of exchange or the representative of the energy sector
who can issue a note. Also a trade can take place if both agents are from
O-sector and there is a single coincidence of wants. Evidently, the seller
does not produce if she is worse off after the trade. We assume that the
buyer (except for the trades with the energy sector, which has the power to
act as a monopsonist, and pair-wise meetings of O-agents) makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, which enables her to extract all the seller’s
surplus from trade. More precisely, we determine a quantity produced
in each round of trade as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which
satisfies
qj = argmax
[
u(q) + V js − V jb
]θ[
V jb − kq − V js
]1−θ
,
where V jb ∈ {V jn , V jm}, j ∈ {E,O}, and θ is the bargaining power of a buyer.
Due to the assumption above, buyers have absolute bargaining power in
this model, i.e. θ = 1. This also means that if a trade takes place, the
seller produces her reservation quantity, i.e., the quantity that makes her
indifferent between producing and not producing. Therefore an E-seller
produces amount qEn (for a note) or q
E
m (for a unit of money) given by
V En − V Es = qEn , and V Em − V Es = qEm. (4)
For an O-seller, we derive in a similar way
V On − V Os = kqOn , and V Om − V Os = kqOm. (5)
An E-buyer decides whether to spend her means of exchange given the
amount of good the seller agrees to produce. We assume that the buyer
trades if she is not worse off after the trade, therefore she spends her unit
of money with probability xEEm when she meets an E-producer, where
xEEm =
{
x iff u(qEm) ≥ V Em − V Es
0 otherwise. (6)
Similarly, an E-note holder spends her note with probability xEEn in a
meeting with an E-seller, and
xEEn =
{
x iff u(qEn ) ≥ V En − V Es
0 otherwise. (7)
Notice that (4), (6) and (7) together imply that
xEEm =
{
x iff u(qEm) ≥ qEm
0 otherwise; (8)
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and
xEEn =
{
x iff u(qEn ) ≥ qEn
0 otherwise. (9)
Cases when a buyer from the productive sector meets a seller from
O-sector or vice versa can be treated in the same way. Notice that E- and
O-agents do not have to make decisions whether to purchase the energy
or not — they have to do it due to the consumption constraint specified
earlier, and this gives E-sector the monopsony power. Due to the existence
of the informal networks, the agents of O-sector do not have to search for
each other, and the production level inside the sector is determined by the
central planner of the sector in order to maximize the overall welfare of
the sector. The agents of the sector are unproductive and cannot acquire
as much energy as they used to under the former command system when
the energy was extremely cheap. In other words, the energy constraint,
which stems from the consumption specification, is binding.
The behavior of the energy sector is more complicated because on one
hand, it optimizes its own welfare, and on the other hand, it has to satisfy
the requirements imposed by the government. G sector sells its output for
notes it issues and for money. The quantities of good it redeems for a note,
qGEn and q
GO
n , for a note-holder of E-sector and O-sector, respectively, as
well as the quantities bought for a unit of money are determined by the
energy sector in order to maximize its welfare. G-sector also sets the price
(the reciprocal of qGEm ) when it sells the energy to the productive agents for
money. The amount of the energy sold for a unit of money to the buyer of
the unproductive sector is fixed by the price ceiling set by the government.
In addition, the G-sector has to decide which mean of exchange to use in
trades with E- and O- producers in order to maximize its welfare and to
meet an obligation (the cash constraint imposed by the government) to sell
a certain proportion, β, or more, of its output for money. The decisions fix
the flows of money and notes G-sector uses in trades with each sector, nGO,
mGO, nGE , mGE . When solving the optimization problem, G-sector must
also ensure that the production level inside the unproductive sector is not
less than αxW , the volume desired by the government. Finally, G-sector
is aware that should the unproductive agents have no money to pay for
the energy, the government will intervene and save the unproductive sector
by forcing the money transfer from the energy sector to the unproductive
sector. The transfer is made to sellers of the latter. We assume that the
government sets the money subsidy asMs = γmOG and view the coefficient
γ ∈ [0, 1] as the policy instrument.
Notice that we take the behavior of the government as given, that is we
do not model the government as an optimizing agent here.
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2.3. Equilibrium concept
In this subsection, we specify the objectives of the agents in more details
and define the equilibrium. Let ρ = r/α be a normalized discount rate. Let
pEs , p
E
m, p
E
n , and p
E be the proportions of type-E sellers, money-holders,
note-holders, and all E-agents, respectively, and V Es , V
E
n , V
E
m and
V E = (pEs V
E
s + p
E
mV
E
m + p
E
n V
E
n )/p
E (10)
value functions, and the weighted value function of E-agents, respectively.
Introduce the flows mGE and mEG of money into E-sector from G-sector
and in the opposite direction, and the flows of notes nGE and nEG into E-
sector from G-sector and into G-sector from E-sector. The flows of energy
consumed by E- and O-sectors are denoted by αxQGE and αxQGO.
Let
PEm = p
E
m(P
E + PO), PEn = p
E
n (P
E + PO), PEs = p
E
s (P
E + PO), (11)
be masses of type-E money-holders, note-holders and sellers, respectively.
Consider an E-buyer with a unit of money. Her value function satisfies
the following Bellman’s equation:
ρV Em =
xmEG
PEm
[V Es + u(q
GE
m )− V Em ] + xEEm pEs [V Es +
+ u(qEm)− V Em ] + xEOm pOs [V Es + u(qOm)− V Em ].
In words, the expected discounted flow of value of the buyer equals the sum
of all expected net gains from trade. Namely, with probability xEEm p
E
s the
buyer meets a seller of her type whose good she likes, or with probability
xEOm p
O
s the buyer meets an O-producer whose good she desires; also she
has to purchase the energy from the G-sector with probability mEG/PEm
to satisfy the consumption technology constraint. As a result of all of such
meetings, the buyer becomes a seller.
By similar reasoning, we can obtain the rest of Bellman’s equations for
E-agents.
ρV En =
xnEG
PEn
[V Es + u(q
GE
n )− V En ] + xEEn pEs [V Es +
+ u(qEn )− V En ] + xEOn pOs [V Es + u(qOn )− V En ],
ρV Es =
xmGE
PEs
[V Em − V Es − qEm] +
nGE
PEs
[V En − V Es − qEn ] +
+ xEEm p
E
m[V
E
m − V Es − qEm] + xEEn pEn [V En − V Es − qEn ]
+ xOEm p
O
m[V
E
m − V Es − qEm] + xOEn pOn [V En − V Es − qEn ].
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Let Ms be the volume of direct subsidies, which the government transfers
from the energy sector to the old sector, when the latter is unable to pay for
the energy. Reasoning in the same way as above, we can derive Bellman’s
equations for O-agents:
ρV Om =
xmOG
POm
[V Os + u(q
GO
m )− V Om ] + xOEm pEs [V Os +
+ u(qOm)− V Om ] + xpOB,
ρV On =
xnOG
POn
[V Os + u(q
GO
n )− V On ] + xOEn pEs [V Os +
+ u(qEn )− V On ] + xpOB,
ρV Os =
xmGO
POs
[V Om − V Os − kqOm] +
xnGO
POs
[V On − V Os − kqOn ] +
+ xEOm p
E
m[V
O
m − V Os − kqOm] + xEOn pEn [V On − V Os − kqOn ]
+ xpOB + ρx
Ms
POs
[V Om − V Os ].
Here B is the benefit from quid pro quo exchange between two agents of
O-sector, which we do not identify explicitly in his model. As compared to
the E-sellers, O-sellers have an additional value which equals the expected
government direct subsidy.
The energy sector maximizes its welfare, which depends on the volumes
of goods being traded with productive and unproductive agents of the
economy. As we have mentioned it earlier, the main part of income of the
energy sector comes from its sales abroad therefore the sector has to obey
all government constraints in order to have an opportunity to earn the
foreign revenue. Thus the G-sector optimizes
WG = mGEbqEm −mEGqGEm + nGEbqEn − nEGqGEn + (12)
+ mGObqOm −mOGqGOm + nGObqOn − nOGqGOn −Ms
subject to the cash constraints
QGOn ≤
1− β
β
QGOm and Q
GE
n ≤
1− β
β
QGEm (13)
and the production constraint, which ensures that the volume produced
by O-sector per unit of time is not less than αxW , which gives
mGOqOm +Q
O + nGOqOGn ≥W. (14)
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To summarize, we take as given the government behavior (i.e., the pro-
duction and cash constraints, the policy variable γ, the supply of money
provided by the government, and the price ceiling), the consumption tech-
nology requiring energy, the market power of the energy sector and the
sizes of productive and unproductive sectors. The agents’ preferences and
production technologies as well as the amount of production feasible for
the energy sector (which characterizes the size of this sector indirectly) are
also given exogenously. Now we are in a position to define equilibrium as
a list of endogenous variables g =
{
qEm, q
O
m, q
GE
m , q
E
n , q
O
n , q
GE
n , q
GO
n , V
E
s ,
V Os , V
E
n , V
O
n , V
E
m , V
O
m , W
G, mGE , mEG, nEG, nGE , mGO, mOG, nGO,
nGO, xEEm , x
EO
m , x
OE
m , x
EE
n , x
EO
n , x
OE
n
}
such that
• value functions satisfy Bellman’s equations
• production levels satisfy (4)– (5)
• trading strategies satisfy optimality conditions (8)– (9)
• G-sector maximizes WG subject to (13) and (14)
• flows of liquidity satisfy steady state conditions (see below).
Notice, that unlike in our previous model (see Boyarchenko and Leven-
dorskiˇi 2000, 2001), we do not model incentives of agents here. In fact,
if the G-sector defects on redeeming a note, then eventually other agents
will stop accepting notes from this sector. So as long as the sector finds it
optimal to issue notes, it will not defect on them. We will show later that
the existence of notes is the main vehicle for the transfer of value from E-
to O-sector. O-agents may have incentives to deviate from the pattern of
behavior prescribed by the central planner, but since in many cases the
informal networks use non-economic means to support the participation of
agents, modeling of incentive compatibility constraints for the O-agents is
out of scope of our project.
3. GENERAL ANALYSIS
It is obvious, that the list of possible combinations of patterns of exchange
between agents of the economy is huge, and the model may have mul-
tiple equilibria. In this project, we are going to look at a certain type
of equilibrium. Namely, we will consider an equilibrium when E- and
O-agents do not trade with each other. At the same time, E-agents use
both media of exchange in trades with each other and the energy sector.
In Boyarchenko (2000), Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇi (2000, 2001), it was
shown that such equilibrium was possible in particular, when a parameter
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h := r/xα, which we call the trading friction, is sufficiently small. This
happens when the number of single coincidence meetings per unit of time
is large so that agents can be patient and wait for a better trading opportu-
nity to arrive. An E-buyer will not be willing to trade with an O-producer
unless the latter produces sufficiently high quantity of good. But if the
difference in productivity of agents is substantial, that is, k−1 is not small,
the less productive agents cannot produce the amount E-buyers demand
for any mean of exchange since later they cannot get for it an amount of
good, which compensates for the disutility of production.
Thus, we are going to examine the case when equilibrium prices are such
that it is not optimal for more productive agents to purchase goods man-
ufactured by low productivity agents. If it had not been due to the gov-
ernment constraints, the energy sector would not have been buying from
the O-sector as well. In fact, if the government subsidizes the latter sector
heavily, then as we have shown in our interim report on the project, the
G-sector does not buy from O-sector with money, so that mGO = 0, and
mOG = Ms. In one of the following subsections, we will consider other
variants of the government subsidizing policy.
As the rigorous analysis in Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇi (2000, 2001)
shows, less productive agents are willing to buy from more productive
agents. In the model under consideration, neither the government nor the
energy sector are willing to provide the O-sector with extra liquidity, so
that the production constraint for this sector is binding, and the amount
of liquidity accumulated by the sector just suffices to pay for the energy.
Thus, there arise two circles of exchange, each involving G-sector. We will
consider them in detail in the Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, and now we derive
the steady state conditions for flow of money and notes.
In equilibrium, the flows of money from the energy sector to E-sector and
in the opposite direction are equal, therefore m := mGE = mEG. By the
same token, the flows of notes between the sectors satisfy n := nGE = nEG
and n˜ := nGO = nOG. The money flow, mOG from the old sector to the
G-sector equals the money flow in the opposite direction plus the subsidy,
i.e.,
mOG = mGO +Ms. (15)
Next, we derive simplified Bellman’s equations for the equilibrium under
consideration. First, we notice that since E- and O-agents do not trade
with each other, probabilities xEOm = x
OE
m = x
EO
n = x
OE
n = 0. On the
other hand, since E-agents do trade among themselves, xEEm = x
EE
n = x,
that is the agents are always willing to buy a good whenever they derive
a positive utility of consumption. Next, we take into account (4)– (5).
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Finally, since the energy sector acts as a monopsonist in all trades with
E-sector and in note-trades with O-sector, it extracts all buyers’ surplus
in these trades, therefore we have
u(qGEm ) = V
E
m − V Es = qEm, (16)
u(qGEn ) = V
E
n − V Es = qEn , (17)
u(qGOn ) = V
O
n − V Os = kqOn . (18)
Now we can write the simplified Bellman’s equations for E-sector as
hqEm = p
E
s [u(q
E
m)− qEm], (19)
hqEn = p
E
s [u(q
E
n )− qEn ], (20)
V Es = 0. (21)
The simplified Bellman’s equations for the O-sector can be derived in a
similar fashion. We can also simplify the G-sector’s objective function as
WG = m(bqEm − qGEm ) + n(bqEn − qGEn ) + (22)
+ mGObqO −mOGqGOm + n˜(bqOn − qGOn )−Ms.
4. MAIN RESULTS
We present detailed analysis and the solution to our model in Subsec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3. Before doing this, we find it sensible to present the list
of technical results and the main theorem. We start with the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) When redeeming a note for an unproductive agent, G-
sector produces the amount qGOn , which solves the problem
u(q)
/
q → max, (23)
that is, the solution to the equation
u′(q)q = u(q), (24)
and it charges for a note it issues to the same agents
qOGn = u(q
GO
n ) > q
GO
n ;
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(ii) qGOn is less than the socially optimal value q∗ defined from
u′(q∗) = 1,
but for qOn , the answer is ambiguous;
(iii) G-sector charges for a note it issues to a productive agent the maxi-
mum amount qEn , which solves an equation
(1 + h/pEs )q = u(q), (25)
where pEs is the proportion of sellers of E-sector;
(iv) G-sector buys with the unit of money the same amount from E-agent
as when it issues a note;
(v) if the trading friction is small then qEn is larger than the socially optimal
amount q∗, and in all cases,
qOn < q
E
n < q
∗,
where q∗ is the larger solution to the equation
u(q) = q;
(vi) quantities G-sector produces are largest solutions to the equations
u(qGOn ) = q
O
n ; u(q
GE
n ) = q
E
n ; u(q
GE
m ) = q
E
m;
in particular, G-sector extracts all the surplus from the trades except for
the sales it makes for money to unproductive agents, when it has to sell at
a loss for a fixed price;
(vii) if the trading friction is small, the quantities above are related as
follows:
qGOn < q
O
n < q
GE
n = q
GE
m < q
E
n = q
E
m < q
∗; (26)
(viii) the ratio of the volume of notes issued to unproductive agents and
the production level W required by the government is given by
nGO
W
=
k(1− β)
u(qGOn )(1− β + κ)
; (27)
thus, the volume of notes grows with W, and decreases when the volume of
payments to be made with the money increases;
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(ix) the ratio of the flow of energy into O-sector and the required production
level is given by
QGO
W
=
kqGOn
u(qGOn )(1− β + κ)
; (28)
the flow of energy into O-sector increases with both W and β;
(x) if QE := Q − QGO and ME := M −mOG −mGO are positive, then
the trades between G and E sector are possible, the ones with money
including, and
• the money flow from G to E and in the opposite direction is given by
m =
βQE
qG
; (29)
• the flow of notes from G to E and in the opposite direction is given by
n =
(1− β)QE
qG
; (30)
• the proportion of E-sellers, pEs , is a solution to
(pE − pEs )pEs =
κQE
(PE + PO)qE
, (31)
to be more precise, a pair qE := qEn = q
E
m and p
E
s solve the system
(25), (31);
• the number of E-note-holders is
PEn = P
E − (PO + PE)pEs −M +mOG +mGO +m. (32)
The lemma gives the equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables as
functions of the exogenous ones, and describes price discriminations. In
the following theorem, we single out the main results.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the trading friction is sufficiently small. Then
the following statements hold :
a) Generically, the economy can be in 4 steady states, which are labeled by
solutions to the system (25), (31).
b) The energy sector gains in all non-monetary trades. To be more specific,
in such trades, the energy sector exercises its monopoly power: this can be
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seen from the fact that it produces less redeeming a note, than it gets issuing
a note.
c) The prices in the sector of non-productive firms and in non-monetary
trades between the energy sector and non-productive agents are higher than
in the sector of productive agents and in the trades between the energy
sector and productive agents.
d) In order to satisfy the government requirement, the energy sector ensures
the production in the sector of non-productive agents but on the level below
the socially optimal one.
Remark. Notice that one of the primary goals of any monetary model
is to determine endogenously prices of goods traded in the market. Our
model provides such prices as reciprocals to the quantities of goods traded
for a unit of money or a note. Moreover, the solution to our model indicates
price distortions which result from the existence of money substitutes.
Point b) above summarizes this.
4.1. On the dynamics of the notes
in circulation after August 1998 crisis
From (27) and (30), we see that the volumes trades with notes of G-sector
decreases with the growth of the size of G-sector, which does not accept
notes; the effect on the number of notes in E-sector is not so apparent
but numerical results show that it exists. The effect of the increase of the
money supply M is the most prominent: see (32).
But the most interesting is the following possibility: if the trading friction
is sufficiently small, then generically, the system (25), (31) has 4 solutions,
the set of solutions being of the form
(qE− , p
E
s,−), (q
E
− , p
E
s,+), (q
E
+ , p
E
s,−), (q
E
+ , p
E
s,+)
(modulo small errors). By exercising its monopoly power, for a given
proportion of E-sellers, G-sector will choose the price system with the
larger qE , which will give it higher trade surplus. If the trading friction
is small, the price system is almost the same for the both values of pEs
(see (25)), and all characteristics of the economy are essentially the same
for both possible values of pEs , except for the number of E-note-holders
in E-sector , and hence, except for the volume of non-monetary trades in
E-sector .
Thus, if due to some external shock, the number of active producers looking
for buyers (in this model, the producers are sellers) increases, it is possible
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that the system will move into another steady state, with a smaller volume
of notes in circulation.
4.2. Production and trades in O-sector
and between O- and G-sectors
Let αxQGOm and αxQ
GO
n be the amount of energy produced by G-sector for
O-sector, for money and notes, respectively, and αxQGO the total amount
per unit of time. Since O-agents consume goods of O-sector (an amount
αxQO, where QO = POqO, and αxqO is an amount produced by O-agent
per unit of time for other O-agents), goods of E-sector purchased for notes,
and energy (an amount αx(QGOm + Q
GO
n )), the consumption technology
constraint assumes the form
QO = κ(QGOm +Q
GO
n ). (33)
If there exists the price ceiling for sales to O-sector made in the monetary
form, that is, qGOm is fixed, then the money flow αxm
OG from O-sector to
G-sector is determined by
mOG = QGOm /q
GO
m , (34)
and the money flow in the opposite direction satisfies the steady state
condition (15).
Remark. If the government subsidizing policy is state contingent, that
is if the government subsidizes the O-sector only when the latter is short
of money, then in view of (34) and (15), the volume of subsidy must
be determined by the optimizing behavior of G-sector, and this behavior
depends on the constraints imposed by the government. This gives the
possibility of studying the volume of direct subsidies, which the government
will have to arrange for, as a function of its own policies of indirect subsidies
and restrictions; should the value function for the government be specified,
it gives an opportunity to endogenize the government policies. We leave
this possibility for future research.
While writing (15), we implicitly assume that the government closely mon-
itors the subsidized O-sector and does not allow O-agents to use subsidies
except for buying the energy, which is necessary for production of the sec-
tor. The model admits a modification, when due to imperfect monitoring,
a part of subsidies is spent to buy goods of E-sector (due to the informal
connections, O-sector does not need money for trades inside the sector: it
can use either direct barter or money substitutes its agents issue).
Similarly, G-sector has no incentive to provide O-sector with additional
liquidity, which will be spent not to boost the production inside O-sector
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(which is the concern of G-sector because of the production restriction
imposed by the government) but to simply derive additional utility from
consumption of goods produced by E-sector.
Recall that the G-sector has to satisfy the production constraint, (14), and
the sales constraint, (13), imposed by the government. Due to the price
ceiling established by the government, it is not profitable for the G-sector
to sell the energy to the O-sector for money, hence, the constraint (13) is
binding:
QGOn =
1− β
β
QGOm . (35)
We can also safely presume that the constraint (14) is binding as well: be
it not the case, there would be no need for the government intervention at
all. Hence, we can replace (14) with
mGOqOm +Q
O + nGOqOn =W. (36)
Due to (35) and (36), G-sector simultaneously minimizes QGOm and Q
GO
n .
Let the government subsidy Ms = γmOG, γ ∈ [0, 1]. If γ = 1, that is the
government subsidizes the old sector heavily, then by excluding QO, QGOm
and QGOn from (33), (36) and (35), we obtain
nGOqOn =W − κ
[
1 +
β
1− β
]
nGOqGOn ,
which can be transformed first into
nGO
(
qzOn +
κ
1− β q
GO
n
)
=W,
and then into
(QGOn :=)n
GOqGOn =
W
κ/(1− β) + qOn /qGOn
. (37)
On the other hand, if γ = 0, i.e., the government does not subsidize the
old sector at all, then
mGO = mOG =
βQGOn
(1− β)qGOm
,
and from the corresponding Bellman’s equation, we obtain
hkqOm =
mOG
POm
[u(qGOm )− kqOm]
hkqOm = P
O[u(qGOm )− kqOm].
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By solving the last equation for qOm, we arrive at
qOm =
u(qGOm )
k(h/PO + 1)
.
Now, we can substitute for mGE and qOm in (36) to get
βQGOn
(1− β)qGOm
u(qGOm )
k(h/PO + 1)
+ nGO
(
qzOn +
κ
1− β q
GO
n
)
=W,
which can be transformed into
QGOn =W
(
βu(qGOm )
k(1− β)qGOm (h/PO + 1)
+
κ
1− β +
qOn
qGOn
)−1
. (38)
Since W , κ, qGOm , and β are fixed, and both in (37) and (38) the LHS
is the quantity to be minimized, we see that G-sector maximizes qOn /q
GO
n .
From (18), we know that qOn = u(q
GO
n ), therefore the optimization problem
is:
u(qGOn )
qGOn
→ max . (39)
If γ ∈ (0, 1), then the corresponding Bellman’s equation implies
hkqOm = P
O[u(qGOm )− kqOm]−
γmOG
POs
kqOm or
qOm =
u(qGOm )
k(1 + h/PO + γmOG/PO/POs )
. (40)
Substituting the last equation into (36), we arrive at
(1− γ)mOG u(q
GO
m )
k(1 + h/PO + γmOG/PO/POs )
+ (41)
+nGO
(
qzOn +
κ
1− β q
GO
n
)
=W
mOG =
βQGOn
(1− β)qGOm
. (42)
It follows from (41) and (42) that QGOn is a solution to a quadratic equa-
tion. Tedious computations show that the smaller root of this equation
decreases in qOn /q
GO
n , so the optimization problem remains the same.
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Under conditions (1)– (2), the solution to the optimization problem (39)
exists and it is unique, and qGOn,opt, the optimal amount of energy produced
for a note for agents of O-sectors, is the unique solution to the equation
u′(q)q = u(q). (43)
When qGOn,opt is found, we can find step by step:
• the amount O-agent produces for a note:
qOGn = u(q
GO
n,opt)/k; (44)
• the flow of notes from G-sector into O-sector, and the flow of notes into
opposite direction
nGO = nOG =
W (1− β)
qOGn (1− β + κ)
; (45)
• the flow of energy to O-sector, produced for notes
QGOn = n
GOqGOn ; (46)
• the flow of energy into O-sector, produced for money
QGOm =
β
1− βQ
GO
n ; (47)
• the flow of money into O-sector
mGO +Ms =
QGOm
qGOm
; (48)
• the total flow of energy into O-sector
QGO =
QGOn
1− β ; (49)
• the amount O agent produces for a unit of money from (40);
• the production by O-sector for G-sector
QOG = nGOqOn +m
GOqOm; (50)
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• the production flow inside O-sector
QO =W −QOG; (51)
• the disutility flow suffered by G sector due to trades with O-sector
UG,O := b[nGOqOn +m
GOqOm −W ]; (52)
• the utility extracted by O-sector from G-sector
UO,G := POu(QO/PO) +mOGu(qGOm ). (53)
4.3. Production and trades in E-sector
and between E- and G-sectors
We assume that after G-sector has produced the optimal (given the gov-
ernment restrictions) amount of energy QGO given by (49), the remainder
QE := Q−QGO is positive.
The consumption technology constraint (the constant ratio of the volume
of consumption goods from non-energy sector to the volume of goods from
the energy sector) is
pEmp
E
s q
E
m + p
E
n p
E
s q
E
n
pEm
(
m
/
PEm
)
qGEm + pEn
(
n
/
PEn
)
qGEn
= κ, (54)
and the sales constraint is
mqGEm + nq
GE
n ≤ QE . (55)
Finally, the volume-in-monetary-form constraint is
mqGEm ≥
β
1− β nq
GE
n . (56)
Given the restrictions listed above and the standard assumption that
nobody is worse off after a trade, G-sector solves an optimization problem
m[bqEm − qEGm ] + n[bqEn − qGEn ]→ max, (57)
where b is the coefficient in (3).
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From (16)– (17) by using properties (1)– (2) of the utility function u,
we find that qGEm < q
E
m and q
GE
n < q
E
n , if G-sector extracts all the buyers’
surplus from agents of E-sector. We conclude that if the coefficient b
in (57) is greater than or equal to 1, then it is optimal for G-sector
to trade with E-sector, on conditions which do not make E-sector worse
off. It is seen easily from (19) and (20), that qEm and q
E
n solve the same
equation, that is E-agents produce the same amount of good, qE , in trades
of all types, and qE is a solution to the equation
(1 + h/pEs )q = u(q). (58)
Now (16) and (17) imply that G-sector produces both for a unit of money
and for a note the same amount of energy, qG, which solves the equation
u(qG) = qE . (59)
Under condition (2), (58) may have two solutions, one solution or none;
if u(0) < 0 is sufficiently close to 0, there exist two of them, and it is easy
to see that the difference bqE − qG, which G-sector maximizes, is larger
for the larger qE (we assume that b ≥ 1). Since the G-sector can dictate
prices in relations with E-sector, she will choose greater qE (and hence,
greater qG).
Since qEm = q
E
n = q
E , qGEm = q
GE
n = q
G, and pEm + p
E
n = p
E − pEs , we can
rewrite (54)– (57) as
(pE − pEs )pEs =
κqG(
PE + PO
)
qE
[m+ n], (60)
m+ n ≤ QE
qG
, (61)
m ≥ β
1− β n, (62)
[m+ n](bqE − qG)→ max . (63)
It follows that the constraint (61) is binding, and the total flow of liquidity
m+ nEG, which flows from E-sector into G-sector, is determined by
m+ n =
QE
qG
. (64)
By substituting (64) into (60), we obtain an equation for pEs :
(pE − pEs )pEs =
κQE
(PE + PO)qE
, (65)
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Suppose that E-sector is not very small, so that the total flow of liquidity
into it, determined from (64), is less than the total mass of E-sector:
QE/q
E < PE . (66)
Then from the system (58), (65), we can find a pair (qE , pEs ), which is
independent of a choice of m satisfying
QEβ
qG
≤ m < ME/2. (67)
Notice that G-sector maximizes
(m+ n)[bqE − qG] = (m+ n)[bqE − u−1(qE)].
When the trading friction is small, we conclude from (58)– (1), that
bqE − u−1(qE) ↑ as qE ↓,
that is, when the price level in E-sector and in trades between E and G
sectors increases, the monopolist gains more. But from (58), it is equiv-
alent to pEs ↓; the only way G-sector can decrease the size of pEs , is to
issue as many notes as possible. Thus, G-sector does not use money unless
forced to, that is, the left constraint in (67) is binding:
m =
QEβ
qG
. (68)
Notice that m is the number of E-money-holders who trade with G-sector
at a given moment of time, and find, step by step:
• a pair (qE , pEs ), which solves a system (58), (65), with the greater qE
of two for the same pEs ;
• qG = qG(qE);
• the number of E-note-holders who trade with G-sector:
n =
QE(1− β)
qG
; (69)
• the total number of E-money-holders:
mE =ME −m; (70)
• the total number of E-note-holders:
nE = PE − (PO + PE)pEs −mE ; (71)
• the weighted value function of type-E agents:
V E = (1− pEs /pE)qE . (72)
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4.4. The proof of
“no-buying-for-notes-from-more-productive
agents-by-less productive agents”
Suppose, that an O-seller acquires a note from an E-note-holder. If the
trading friction is sufficiently small, the latter will not buy unless the
former agrees to produce qE . Hence, the former will suffer the disutility
kqE . On acquiring the note, the O-agent will buy the energy, qGOn , and
derive the utility u(qGOn ). By comparing equations for the optimal q
E ,
which is the larger root (we assume it exists) and for the optimal qGOn ,
and taking into account (1)– (2), we find that u(qGOn ) ≤ qE . Hence, it is
not individually optimal for an O-seller to produce for a note to E-note-
holders.
4.5. Example
Let c, d be positive constants, and θ ∈ (0, 1). Then
u(q) = −c+ dqθ (73)
satisfies (1) and (2), and (43) assumes the form
θdqθ = −c+ dqθ. (74)
We find
qGOn,opt =
(
c
d(1− θ)
)1/θ
, (75)
and after that all endogenous variables, which describe relations between G
and O sectors. After that, we can find numerically qE as the larger solution
to (58) (which exists, if c > 0 is not too large); qE is a function of pEs .
Next, we find pEs , after that, q
G from (59), and the rest of the endogenous
variables, which characterize the relations in E-sector and between E- and
G-sectors.
4.6. Calibration problem
Certainly, it would be highly desirable to calibrate the model, and this was
our intention when we planned the project. However, the following princi-
pal problems with the data available seem to be too difficult to overcome:
• In the statistical data, all kind of barter are treated the same whereas
in the framework of our model, the goods acquired for the transaction
purposes must be treated as a mean of exchange;
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• To calibrate the model, we need to distinguish the volume of trades,
the flows of means of exchange, etc., between non-restructured and new
or restructured enterprizes, and we were unable to find reasonable proxies
for these two sectors; all the data seem entangled.
5. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
1. The policy of direct and indirect subsidies ensures that the natural
monopolies produce for unproductive agents but on the level below the
socially optimal one.
2. If a part of the natural monopolies does not accept notes, then unpro-
ductive agents cannot survive without direct subsidies.
3. The increase of the money supply and of the size of the part of the
natural monopolies which does not accept the money substitutes lead to
the contraction of the volume of money substitutes in circulation.
4. The larger the production level in the unproductive sector, which the
government requires, the larger the amount of the direct subsidies needed,
and the larger the volume of money substitutes in circulation.
5. Reduction in direct subsidies increases the value of holding money for
O-agents, which creates an incentive for them to produce for money.
6. Our model shows that generically, the economy may be in either of two
steady states with approximately the same price systems but with different
volumes of notes in circulation, and hence, August 1998 crisis might have
lead to the change of the steady state, the new one having less volume of
notes in circulation. We conjecture that should the productive economic
activity be suppressed due to some adverse external shock, the volume of
money substitutes in circulation may sharply increase.
7. As it was already mentioned in the paper, the role for money substitutes
arises in the model endogenously. To summarize, the role of such money
is two-fold: first, in trades with the productive sector, it is an additional
mean of exchange in the economy with the lack of liquidity, second, and
more important, the ability to issue universally accepted money substitutes
allows the energy sector to extract value from the unproductive sector, and
satisfy at the same time the production constraint imposed by the govern-
ment. Notice, that the energy sector cannot exercise its monopoly power
in monetary trades with the unproductive sector due to the price ceiling.
The value extracted by the energy sector from the productive sector is
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(partially) transferred in the form of direct subsidies to the unproductive
sector.
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